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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Lonnie Hust appeals from the district court's Order of Dismissal regarding his 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Mr. Hust asserts that the district court erred by 
dismissing his Petition prior to ruling on his motion for appointment of counsel and 
without appointing counsel to assist Mr. Hust in the post-conviction proceeding. This 
Reply Brief will focus only on the State's assertions that Mr. Hust waived any challenge 
to the district court's failure to address his motion for appointment of counsel and that 
the district court is not required to address a motion for appointment of counsel when a 
petition for post-conviction relief is untimely on its face. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Hust's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Hust's post-conviction petition prior 
to ruling on his request for counsel and by failing to appoint counsel to assist him in the 
post conviction proceedings? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred Bv Dismissing Mr. Hust's Post-Conviction Petition Prior To 
Rulina On His Request For Counsel And Erred By Failinq To Appoint Counsel To Assist 
Mr. Hust 
A. Mr. Hust Did Not Waive His Ability To Challenqe The District Court's Failure To 
Address His Motion For Appointment Of Counsel 
The State asserts that Mr. Hust waived his right to challenge the district court's 
failure to address his motion for appointment of counsel by stating that "Petitioner is 
requesting Counsel to assist him in perfecting his First Direct Appeal, not this post- 
conviction relief petition." (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5; R., p.19.) Mr. Hust filed his 
Petition on December 14, 2007, and also filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for 
Appointment of Counsel that same day. (R., pp.3-7; Augmentation: Motion and Affidavit 
in Support for Appointment of Counsel.) In his Response to State's Motion to Dismiss, 
Mr. Hust again reiterated that he was requesting counsel to assist him. (R., p.14.) 
Mr. Hust again asked that the district court address his appointment of counsel request 
when he filed a Motion and Request for Stay on State's Motion to Dismiss, requesting 
that the district court "put a stay on States Motion to Dismiss, until court grants petitioner 
request for counsel." (R., p.16.) 
Mr. Hust then filed a Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss addressing only the 
merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.18-20.) It is in this 
response, which appears nearly identical in form and substance to his Response to 
State's Motion to Dismiss, that Mr. Hust made the statement about requesting counsel 
for his appeal. (R., p.19.) Mr. Hust asserts that this was either a typographical error, 
which he, acting pro se, forgot to correct as it had been corrected in his earlier, nearly 
identical filing, or was the result of a lack of understand as to the remedy he was 
requesting in his post-conviction, i.e., that he be able to file his an appeal addressing his 
original judgment and be appointed an attorney to handle his appeal. The 
overwhelming number of requests for appointment of counsel suggest that it was not his 
intention to abandon these requests, but instead a mistake made by a pro se petitioner. 
Because he was acting pro se, Mr. Hust requests that this Court find that his statement 
was made in error, that he continued to assert his request for appointment of counsel, 
and, as such, did not waive the argument on appeal. 
B. The District Court Is Reauired To Address A Motion For A~pointment Of Counsel 
When A Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Is Untimelv On Its Face 
In claiming that Mr. Hust's petition was "frivolous," the State's focus on the 
alleged violation of the statute of limitations has incorrectly placed the proverbial cart 
before the horse. The State asks this Court to hold that a petitioner can be denied 
counsel and the post-conviction action dismissed if, based upon the face of the petition, 
the petition appears untimely. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-12.) 
Unfortunately, the tolling issue was never addressed by the district court, nor was 
it specifically addressed by Mr. Hust in his pro se response, which of course is not 
surprising because the district court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss merely concludes that 
Mr. Hust's Petition is untimely, without analyzing any possible exceptions or informing 
him that equitable tolling is a potential exception to the timeliness requirement. Thus, a 
pro se petitioner with possible physical, mental, and/or educational limitations as 
compared to a licensed attorney, would have no reason to raise or understand a 
technical legal argument such as equitable tolling. Despite the obvious deference given 
to allegations in a post conviction action by a pro se petitioner, as repeatedly recognized 
ldaho Courts, the State implies that Mr. Hust failed to raise facts sufficient to show that 
appointed counsel would be able to present a valid argument for equitable tolling of the 
limitations period and, as such, the dismissal of his petition is proper. This argument is 
flawed because Mr. Hust was not required to assert facts supporting a claim of tolling 
the statue of limitations and because requiring a pro se petitioner to undersiand the 
elements of a tolling claim places an unreasonable burden upon him. 
1. Mr. Hust Was Not Required To Assert Facts Supportina A Claim Of Tolling 
The Statute Of Limitations In His Petition For Post Conviction Relief 
An assertion of facts supporting a claim of tolling of the statute of limitations "is 
not an element of a claim for post-conviction relief; it is a response to the State's 
affirmative defense that the claim is time barred." Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 
792, 992 P.2d 783, 787 (1999). Thus, it is not necessary for a post-conviction petitioner 
to include allegations about tolling in the petition. Id. "To hold otherwise would require 
inmates, who are untrained in the law and are generally acting without the benefit of 
counsel in the preparation of their applications, to anticipate possible affirmative 
defenses and negate them even before the affirmative defense has been pleaded." Id. 
Because a petitioner need not anticipate the affirmative defenses that may or 
may not be asserted in his case and, thus, need not negate the affirmative defense of a 
violation of the statute of limitation in the initial petition, a petitioner should not be denied 
counsel and his petition dismissed for failure to do these things. Demanding such 
action on the part of a pro se petitioner would require him not only to anticipate possible 
defenses, but also to know what the essential elements of a tolling claim are. Idaho's 
appellate courts have recognized that this is an unreasonable burden to place on pro se 
petitioners. Anderson, 133 ldaho at 792, 992 P.2d at 787; Charboneau v. State, 140 
ldaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, I11  1 (2004). Thus, the denial of counsel and a 
dismissal based upon a finding that the petition appears to be time-barred is premature 
and reversible error. 
2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Failinq To Appoint Counsel To 
Assist Mr. Hust Because He Presented The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
And , As A Pro Se Petitioner, Was Likely Unable To Satisfv The Dauntinq 
Burden Of Presentinq An Equitable Tollinq Argument 
In the present case, the application of the legal analysis applicable to requests 
for the appointment of counsel shows that the district court committed reversible error 
when it failed to appoint counsel for Mr. Hust. As the ldaho Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized, when considering whether to appoint counsel in a post- 
conviction case. 
the trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a 
pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts 
sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, 
they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does 
not know what are the essential elements of a claim. 
Charboneau, 140 ldaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 11 11 ; see also Swader v. State, 143 ldaho 
651, 653, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007) (stating "In Brown v. Sfafe, 135 ldaho 676, 23 P.3d 
138 (2001), we noted that a pro se petitioner may fail to allege sufficient facts to state a 
claim for post-conviction relief simply because he or she does not know the essential 
elements of the claim."). In addition, the trial courts must consider "whether 
circumstances prevent the petitioner from making a more thorough investigation into the 
facts," such as when the petitioner is incarcerated, and whether presentation of a claim 
will "require the assistance of someone trained in the law," such as when a petitioner 
must show "that his or her counsel's performance was deficient or that such deficiency 
prejudiced the defense." Swader, 143 ldaho at 655, 152 P.3d at 16. Thus, "the trial 
court should appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a 
valid claim such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to 
retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader, 143 ldaho at 
655, 152 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Hust alleged facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a 
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a 
further investigation into his claims. In addition, it should be noted that Mr. Hust's claim 
related to his receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim will "require the 
assistance of someone trained in the law," as Mr. Hust must show "that his or her 
counsel's performance was deficient [and] that such deficiency prejudiced the defense." 
Swader, 143 ldaho at 655,152 P.3d at 16. 
In the instant case, the district court found that Mr. Hust's Petition was untimely 
because it was filed more than a year after the time period during which he could have 
appealed the district court's order revoking his probation. (See R., pp.10-12, 26.) ldaho 
Code § 19-4902 provides: "An application [for Post-Conviction reliefj may be filed at 
any time within one (1) year from the expiration from the time for appeal or from the 
determination of an appeal or from the determination from a proceeding following an 
appeal, whichever is later." I.C. Ij 19-4902. The ldaho Court of Appeals has recognized 
that a petitioner who files a post-conviction application within the limitations period 
relevant to a post judgment motion, but beyond the limitations period relevant to the 
judgment of conviction, may address those issues that arose from the post judgment 
motion, or the proceedings leading up to it. See Gonzalez v. State, 139 ldaho 384, 79 
P.3d 743 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Mr. Hust concedes that his Petition was not filed within a year and 42 days from 
the district court's order imposing sentence. However, had counsel been appointed to 
represent Mr. Hust with his post-conviction action, he possibly could have produced 
sufficient evidence to toll the statute of limitations. In Idaho, equitable tolling of the 
statute of limitations for the filing of a petition for post conviction relief has been 
recognized: "(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an 
in-state conviction without legal representation or access to ldaho legal materials; 
(2) and where mental disease andlor psychotropic medication renders a petitioner 
incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to his convictions." 
Sayas v. State, 139 ldaho 957, 960,88 P.3d 776, 780 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Recognizing that he was unable to properly respond to the Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, Mr. Hust requested that his case be stayed until counsel was appointed and 
again requested appointment of counsel. (R., pp.13-17.) Mr. Hust concedes that he did 
not provide any information regarding equitable tolling in his response. Yet, requiring 
him to do so would require him not only to anticipate possible defenses, but also to 
know what the essential elements of a tolling claim are, placing an unreasonable burden 
on pro se petitioners. Anderson, 133 ldaho at 792, 992 P.2d at 787. Instead, he did all 
that he was capable of, again requesting counsel be appointed to assist him. 
The State has merely speculated that Mr. Hust would never be able to establish 
a valid equitable tolling claim; however, with the assistance of counsel, as repeatedly 
requested, such a claim may have been successfully presented to the court. 
Accordingly, because Mr. Hust raised the possibility of a valid claim, which upon the 
investigation of counsel may include the possibility of a valid equitable tolling exception 
to the time limit, his case should be remanded to the district court with instructions that 
counsel be appointed to guide him through the complex post conviction proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hust respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his Petition and remand his case so that he may be appointed 
counsel to proceed with this post-conviction action. 
DATED this loth day of March, 2009. 
&A& 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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